Kit Fine ([Fine 2005]) has articulated a position according to which reality is fragmented. In this paper I will refer to this view as ‘Heterodox Presentism’. I want to try and do two things. First, I want to try and undermine the arguments presented by Fine in favour of Heterodox Presentism and show that the view is unmotivated—in part by the fact that it fails to meet some of the standards that Fine sets for it. The second target aim is to offer some very informal and sketchy remarks as to how we might better construe the ‘standard’ view of realism, or ‘presentism’ to which Fine objects—the view that I will define here as ‘only present objects exist’. As we shall see, my own view of presentism differs quite substantially from this pithy slogan.

The Author

Jonathan Tallant is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham (UK) and President of the Philosophy of Time Society. His main areas of research are Philosophy of Time, and Presentism in particular. He has published many papers in the philosophy of time and is also the author of Metaphysics: An Introduction (Continuum, 2011).

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