Some claim that in addition to causal explanation there is a distinctive form of metaphysical explanation. While in causal explanations the explanans and explanandum are connected through a causal mechanism, in metaphysical explanations they’re connected through a constitutive form of determination, that of grounding. The primary goal of this chapter is to set out and clarify some of the central issues and disputes concerning grounding. I begin by distinguishing two general approaches to grounding – on one approach our talk of grounding in philosophy is univocal, and on the other it isn’t – and consider different ways in which each view might be further developed. Then I consider the logical form of grounding statements as well as the structural principles that govern grounding. Next, I take up the matter of how the notions of grounding, modality, and reduction interact. I close with a brief discussion of the grounds for what grounds what.

Authors’ Biography

Kelly Trogdon is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. His recent work concerns the nature of grounding and its application to longstanding issues in the philosophy of mind. His other research interests include the nature of intrinsicality, the monism/pluralism debate in sparse ontology, and what it is to be acquainted with the phenomenal character of our experiences.

Quantity: