Since Nozick introduced it in 1969, Newcomb's Problem has been the subject of endless debate.
Up to date, no agreement on a solution has been achieved. In this work Arndt Britschgi shows that, rather than a paradox, Newcomb's Problem obeys the ex falso quodlibet principle. It is not the case that, from a given set of logically consistent premises, we arrive at contradictory conclusion,
but instead the premises themselves constitute an obvious contradiction – that from a set of contradictory premises we arrive at a contradictory conclusion is not a paradox,
but eminently logical. In the general context of the free-will problematic, Britschgi's analysis covers a broad array of philosophically basic issues: determinism and agent causation, statistics and probability, decision and game theoretical calculi, the modal influence of distinct possible worlds, theological views, freedom of choice.
On his way to systematically solving (or dissolving) the Newcomb Paradox, Britschgi continues to discover surprisingly new dimensions in all these fields. A book certain to provoke discussion on many levels.
The Author: Arndt Britschgi was born in Finland, and holds a Bachelor's Degree in Medical Sciences from the University of Helsinki. He spent several years traveling and working in Europe, before settling in Madrid, Spain, in the late eighties. In the mid-nineties Britschgi moved to Switzerland, where he studied Philosophy and Mathematics at the Zürich University. His MA thesis and later research focus on logical-statistical aspects of the free-will problematic. Besides his research, Britschgi also works as a fiction writer. Much of his writing has appeared or is forthcoming in North America and Finland.
177 pp., References
Prospective publication date October 2006
About the Author
Munich 2005
171 pp,Appendix, Bibliorgaphy, List of Figures, List of Symbols and Notations,
List of Named Propositions, Conditions and Rules, Index, Library Binding
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